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INTRODUCTION
Robin Murray
One of the least contentious issues in post war
development thinking was the form of public
administration. There were disputes about the
boundaries between public and private, but not about
how the public sector should be run. Most newly
independent states adopted a model based closely on
metropolitan and colonial forms of administration, or,
in the case of socialist countries, on the Soviet system.
What is striking are the similarities between capitalist
and socialist forms of administration, and the common
influences which shaped them - earlier absolutist
regimes on the one hand, and modern business
organization on the other.
It is this old administrative order which has been
challenged over the last decade. The collapse of the
Eastern European regimes is the most recent and
dramatic example of this challenge, but the neo-liberal
restructuring of Western states is hardly less so. It is
this new market model of the state which is being
transferred to Eastern Europe, and - through
structural adjustment programmes - to many
countries in the Third World. Public administration,
having been a marginal subject in the social sciences,
has now moved to the centre of the stage.
Britain has been one of the most radical proponents of
the neo-liberal state, and those of us living and working
in Britain during the 1980s have witnessed the most
profound changes to public administration in this
country since the mid 19th century. It has not just been
the shifting of the boundaries between public and
private back towards the private. The successive stages
of privatization have certainly done that. It has also
been the introduction into the heart of the state of the
principles and relationships of the commercial world.
In some instances like bus services, water or telephones
the solution was relatively straightforward: private
provision with tendering, regulation, and subsidies to
take account of social need. Where the state was the
purchaser, then contracts should be subject to
compulsory competitive tendering (CGT), with any
in-house service forced to compete against private
competition. In local government this has meant many
councils stripping down their core staff to lawyers,
accountants and contract managers, gradually losing
their in-house services as CGT takes effect. Where
private market provision is not appropriate, the
emphasis has been put on contracting. The central
Government's Next Steps programme has redesignated
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75 Government services and divisions as agencies,
operating on contract to the slimmed down central
departments. IDS itself now receives its government
grant in this form, with a three year contract with the
Overseas Development Administration specifying a
range of outputs to be delivered during the contract
period. Where possible competition is introduced for
such contracts within the public sector - as is the case
in the reformed health service where hospitals compete
for contracts with the fundholders District Health
Authorities and general practitioners.
In all these instances there are common principles of
re-organization: the separation of purchasing and
provision, the specification of services as commodities
which can be paid for on contract, the introduction of
competition, the assurance of the public interest by
regulation and subsidy rather than political or
administrative intervention. Managers have been given
greater autonomy with many of the contracts designed
to encourage a particular concept of management. The
emphasis of the neo-liberal reforms has been on
measurement, and payment on the basis of measure-
ment. Such arrangements have been good for
accountants and lawyers, but have cut across the liberal
professions like teachers or doctors whose pro-
fessionalism is seen by the reformers as a constraint on
trade.
The rationale for this large deconstruction of the state
has been provided by public choice theory. This theory
suggested that state administrations were not dutiful
servants of the public weal, but had their own
individual interests which they pursued at the cost of
the taxpayer.
They had monopoly powers which they continually
sought to expand. This was the explanation for the rise
of state spending in the post war world. The answer was
the same as Adam Smith's, introduce market or quasi
market structures to ensure that in pursuing their
private interests they also produced the public good.
This theory has meant that for the first time since the
new scientific management movement spread through
Western states in the first 30 years of this century, there
is now a clear, confident idea of how public services can
be radically re-ordered. It has provided both a critique
of the old order and a blueprint for the development of
the new.
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The earlier scientific management had focused on the
organization of administration: hierarchy, the division
of labour, and the rule of the expert. The legitimacy of
the system was provided by the theory of representative
government. Citizens elected politicians who decided
on policy. They determined what was produced.
Administrative science was concerned only with how
things were produced, effectively, efficiently and
economically.
Public choice theory highlighted the weakness of this
democratic circuit. It was producer dominated.
Elections were a blunt instrument for determining
what citizens wanted across a whole range of services.
Many electors paid less than they received because of
redistributive policies, and thus favoured an expansion
of services, along with politicians and state workers.
The system therefore lacked both choice and
productive discipline. It was slow to restructure and
resistant to innovation.
The problem has been that the new neo-liberal model
in practice has not only highlighted some of the
weaknesses of the old order, it has also, by omission,
brought out some of its strengths, at the same
time exhibiting new problems of its own. The articles in
this Bulletin explore these themes, with a view to
identifying issues which need to be taken on board for
any post neo-liberal administration.
Maureen Mackintosh on the British National Health
Service Reforms, suggests that there are two key
problems with the new structurçs. First the new
purchasers are not the final clients of health care but
their representatives. Second these representatives,
particularly the District Health Authorities, share an
interest with the hospitals, in maximizing throughput
as against quality because of the system of incentives.
The problem of quality has been one of the most
difficult problems for the tradition of scientific
management in the private as in the public sector, and
remains a critical weakness in the neo-liberal state.
As far as the NHS is concerned, Maureen Mackintosh
suggests that the only reason that quality has been
maintained has been through the operation of
professional networks and values inherited from the old
NHS. In theoretical terms, if NHS workers had been
merely self interested, the service quality would have
been more seriously hit. It is because they have a
commitment to their service and the patients that many
services are still running. But there is a danger that if a
new moral economy and its system of incentives
continues to treat state workers as solely self interested
individuals, they will become so, and the service will
break down (something of the kind has happened in
British school teaching which has been subject to
similar reforms).
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The neo-liberal response on quality has been three fold:
first, to institute external audits and assessments,
preferably by those outside the providing professions;
second, to allow consumers to decide on quality
through their choice; and third, to institute measures of
quality and penalties for failure to meet certain
standards.
These go some way to meeting the point. Householders
now receive compensation if their telephone or gas
appliance is not mended on time, or their refuse not
collected. Travellers get a rebate for late trains. These
penalties have an effect on providers but bias the
system away from service qualities which cannot be
measured.
There remains a problem of knowledge. Can an
inspector or a purchaser always tell what is the quality
of a service? It has been one of the long standing
problems of public housing that defects appear long
after the contract has been completed and paid for.
Maureen Mackintosh points out that one of the
problems of health care is that patients lack the
knowledge both about what is wrong with them and
what treatment they need. In many instances
professional skills are needed to advise purchasers and
assess services. Consumer associations have grown up
in part to fill this gap.
But the point about knowledge goes further than this.
Robert Chambers argues that civil servants and
development professionals, because of their position in
bureaucratic systems, promote Fordist development
programmes centred round the mass delivery of
standard packages, and are shielded from the poor
results of these programmes by a complicated
'diseconomy' of knowledge. The latter includes
misreporting, selective perception, misleading
questionnaires, diplomatic prudence on the part of the
knowledge workers, and various methods of self
defence against unwelcome news of failure. Robert
Chambers refers to this syndrome as the Self-
Deceiving State, and thereby problematizes the whole
process of bureaucratic knowledge. This is in addition
to the issue of bureaucratic perception, what John
Berger calls 'the ways of seeing'. The issue is not just
one of technical information systems, it is about
paradigms and the ways in which paradigms filter
information and shape choices.
What we should note here is that both the Weberian
and the neo-liberal models had specific theses on
knowledge. In the former the information and
expertise necessary for control was held by central
management assisted by experts. In the latter, it was
argued a) that it was the consumer who knew best, and
b) the central state could never know enough to
adequately plan a system. This had been one of the
principal arguments for a private economy used by
18th century political economists against centralized
cameralism, and then as now what it did was to solve
the problem of information through decentralization.
Yet it is one of the paradoxes of the current neo-liberal
reforms that they are information heavy. The
accountants, examiners, assessors, inspectors,
regulators, and auditors, along with the new
management information systems are all concerned
with generating information for the sake of control.
Equally paradoxical is the fact that this model of
control is close to that of traditional scientific
management.
One of the points made in Robin Murray's article is
that these Taylorian systems of control are being
intensified for state services at the very time that
private industry is recasting its management structure
around a post Taylorist view of organizational
knowledge. Operational responsibility is being decen-
tralized to those with immediate operational knowledge.
There is a new emphasis on how to socialize knowledge
horizontally - amongst groups of workers, between
departments engaged on common problems, and
between firms and their suppliers and customers.
Flows of vertical information (and hierarchical
commands), on the other hand, are being reduced, and
with them the number of middle managers. Against
this, the neo-liberal reforms with their individualizing
systems of incentives, the narrowing of the skills of
front line workers, and the use of tenders and contracts
that serve to weaken the long term relations between
supplier and purchaser, have moved the providers of
public services in a contrary direction.
A second weak area of both Weberian and neo-liberal
thought has been their conception of the social relations
of bureaucracy. For Weber, the bureaucratic machine
abstracted its members from patrimonial relations. By
its insistence on arm's length relations with clients, on
their having no outside employment or ties since their
prime duty was to the state, it insulated administrators
from their surrounding society. Neo-liberalism on the
other hand, with its roots in methodological
individualism and self interest, has little room for non
market social relations at all, unless as the aggregated
self interest of the professions.
There are three kinds of relation we can distinguish in
this respect: those between administrators and the class
and status structures in which they work; those
between the front line operatives and the 'users' of state
services, and those within the bureaucracy itself.
As to the first of these, Robert Wade's paper makes a
fascinating comparison between the Indian and
Korean methods of irrigation management. The first is
quasi Weberian, the second what we can call socially
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embedded bureaucracy. In India the attempt at
separating the irrigation workers from local social
influence paradoxically encouraged opportunistic
relations between agents (the field patrollers) and their
principals within the bureaucracy. The system as a
whole was centralized, with weak feedback from
farmers using the irrigation or from the field patrollers.
In the Korean system, the field patrollers worked part
time in the areas in which they lived, and received their
pay from user charges rather than the state budget.
Each year they were subject to annual reappointment
by local headmen, while the full-time officials of the
local irrigation agency were subject to random
inspections by national inspectors. The whole system
was therefore much more locally responsive but not
'particularistically' responsive. It had a rich set of
overlapping and disordered information networks, and
above all relied for its effectiveness on the long standing
ties between the administrators and those whom they
served and on external monitoring.
The point here is that an effective irrigation system is in
the general interest of a locality. There have to be
safeguards against particular interests subverting the
general interest, but for the most part farmers have a
common concern in seeing the system works
impartially and well.
A contrasting case is presented by Anne Marie Goetz in
her article on gender and administration. She shows
how external structures of patriarchy are replicated and
reinforced within bureaucracies and that this is one of
the reasons for the failure of so many Women in
Development policies. Administrations whose policies
are determined by men, carried out by men, through
delivery structures moulded round the needs of men,
cannot be expected to adequately relate to the needs of
women. Like Robert Chambers she emphasizes
differences in 'ways of seeing', in this case between men
and women, and how the knowledges to which they
give rise are deeply bound into relations of power.
What follows from these examples? First that
administrative systems, as many critics of Weberian
practise have pointed out, can never be fully insulated
from the social and political relations in which they are
embedded, and indeed often use them for administrative
purposes, either positively in the Korean irrigation
case, or negatively with respect to women.
Second, the issue cannot be adequately discussed in
terms of ideal types - whether of a Weberian or neo-
liberal kind. Rather it is a question of administrative
strategies, the direction of which will depend on the
point of view from which the strategy is formulated.
Where there is an attempt to use the state to transform
structures of power inside and outside its own
administration, this will entail the development of new
types of internal relations, and the creation of a strong
collective ethic. Historically, such results have required
long periods of socialization - whether in church, state
or army - and cannot be achieved merely by formal
procedures.
One particularly fruitful focus of discussion arising
from the above has been the micro question of
producer-user relations. This was one area where neo-
liberal theory showed up a blind spot in the Weberian
model, yet in doing so was limited in its own treatment
of the subject. The Korean irrigation example brings
out the potential advantages of producers being part of
the same social networks as the users. There are other
instances. Andy Batkin's discussion of the RDRS in
Bangladesh describes how many of the organization's
field workers come from the same social background as,
and share similar experiences to, those whom they are
organizing. He also shows how RDRS moved from
being a relief assistance organization to one whose tasks
were primarily educational. The former led to a culture
of dependency, the latter encourages greater self
reliance. In each case, there is a sharp contrast in the
relationship between the provider and the user. We can
make the point more generally by saying that much of
development administration involves the user as an
active producer - as a farmer, or industrialist, or
member of a household. The role of the extension
officer, or rural health worker, is like the teacher, to
educate. The effectiveness of the education will depend
critically on the quality of relationships established
between teacher and taught.
Readers of Theo Mars' article will see how this theme is
taken up in a most thought provoking way in the
analysis of relationships within an organization. He
argues that the choices opened up for managers by the
neo-liberal reforms can best be analysed in teçms of the
organization of work. On the one hand there has been a
pressure for managers to use their new powers to
intensify work as work, imposing Taylor's time
discipline in areas of social production previously
shielded from it. On the other hand, there is scope for
them to interpret work in terms of technique, and
technique as something which involves the whole body
- the senses, feelings, skills, imagination, sensitivities
and judgement. He argues that modern organization
presupposes 'people equipped not merely with a
specific body of technique, but a body in which all these
human capacities are mobilized in learning, using,
assessing and replacing any technique.' Because
managers have too often seen work as work, and
workers as parts of a machine, these wider aspects of the
body have been perceived as hostile to production,
rather than being recognized as a key contribution to it.
He concludes that management has to be involved in
4
the pedagogic task of modifying the ways in which
workers perceive in order that they can be integrated
into organizational intelligence. They also need to be
aware of the more bodily conceptions of technique to
help explain the resistance to this process. The
emphasis on human centred administrative processes
shares some of the perspectives of the human relations
school of management, and has recently become a focus
of corporate management attention. It is also one that
has become entirely neglected by the neo-liberal
reforms.
This discussion prompts a general theoretical point.
There is one stream of administrative thought that has
emphasized structures, whether they be rationalized
hierarchies or quasi markets. It tends to abstract from
broader social relations - from issues of class, gender
and race - and to have highly restricted views of the
nature of management and intra-organizational
relationships. The articles in this Bulletin do not
disregard structures - Mick Moore in particular
makes an innovative proposal about how to secure a
pluralistic administrative structure. But they insist that
the issue of the social relationships involved in public
administration cannot be settled by getting the
structural blue prints right. The character of these
relationships is at the very heart of policy and of
effective implementation.
The movement then is away from a view of
administration as a technical instrument, towards one
that sees it as an economy of knowledges, of human
techniques, and of social relationships. In this there are
parallels to the themes of post modernism which have
had so significant an influence on the humanities and
social sciences over the past 25 years. Although only
Anne Marie Goetz and Theo Mars explicitly refer to
post structuralist writings, significantly in relation to
the link of language and power, and of power and the
body - all the papers share a number of post modern
concerns. There is the recognition that power is
decentred and should be analysed (and contested) as it
works at the margins and not just at the formal locus of
power. There is a concern with administrative practices
before institutions, and with strategies rather than
holistic plans. A number of the authors show a post
modern preference for the multiple, for difference over
uniformity, and of mobile arrangements over fixed
structures (Mick Moore's article is in part a critique of
dominant administrative thinking for its failure to
think through the issues of pluralism). The theme of
knowledge as it emerges in this Bulletin - its
multiplicities, its architectures, its technologies and
means of circulation - is significantly the subject
matter of one of the most influential post modern texts
- Jean Francois Lyotard's The Post Modern
Condition, as of the work of Michel Foucault.'
Few of the authors included here would abandon the
Enlightenment problematics of truth, justice,
democracy, and the need for a shared communicative
language as the post modernists have done. But for the
study of administration there is much still to be drawn
from the theoretical and conceptual spaces opened up
by post modernism before its epistemological limits are
reached. This is particularly important at a time when
neo-liberal models of government and administration
Jean Francois Lyotard, 1984, The Post Modern Condition: a Report on
Knowledge, Manchester University Press. The notes on Foucault's
lectures on government and administration have recently been
translated and summarized in G. Burchell, C. Gordon and P. Miller
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are being pressed on to the developing world in an
uncritical form with the same vigour as Weberian
models were promoted in an earlier period. The articles
in this Bulletin prompt doubts about the claims made
on behalf of these models. More important, they are
intended to suggest new ways in which development
administration can be thought about and its problems
posed.
(eds), The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmenrality, Harvester
Wheatsheaf 1991. The introduction by Colin Gordon is particularly
useful.
